On the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom

Sophia 49 (3):333-41 (2010)
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Abstract

I argue that the simple foreknowledge view, according to which God knows at some time t 1 what an agent S will do at t 2 , is incompatible with human free will. I criticize two arguments in favor of the thesis that the simple foreknowledge view is consistent with human freedom, and conclude that, even if divine foreknowledge does not causally compel human action, foreknowledge is nevertheless relevantly similar to other cases in which human freedom is undermined. These cases include those in which certain human actions are logically, rather than causally, foreclosed.

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Citations of this work

Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.

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References found in this work

Responsibility and control.John Martin Fischer - 1982 - Journal of Philsophy 79 (January):24-40.
Responsibility and Control.John Fischer - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):24-40.
Does libertarian freedom require alternate possibilities?Linda Zagzebski - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):231-248.
Alternative possibilities and causal histories.Derk Pereboom - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):119-138.

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