Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):87-98 (2007)
|Abstract||Graham and Maitzen think my CORNEA principle is in trouble because it entails “intolerable violations of closure under known entailment.” I argue that the trouble arises from current befuddlement about closure itself, and that a distinction drawn by Rudolph Carnap, suitably extended, shows how closure, when properly understood, works in tandem with CORNEA. CORNEA does not obey Closure because it shouldn’t: it applies to “dynamic” epistemic operators, whereas closure principles hold only for “static” ones. What the authors see as an intolerable vice of CORNEA is actually a virtue, helping us see what closure principles should—and shouldn’t—themselves be about|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Stephen Maitzen (1998). The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure. Synthese 114 (2):337-354.
Jonathan Schaffer (2007). Closure, Contrast, and Answer. Philosophical Studies 133 (2):233–255.
E. J. Lowe (2000). Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism. Philosophy 75 (294):571-586.
Stephen John Nash (2004). On Closure in Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 11 (1):75-89.
Guido Melchior (2010). Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (30):259-285.
Justin P. McBrayer (2009). Cornea and Inductive Evidence. Faith and Philosophy 26 (1):77-86.
Krista Lawlor (2005). Living Without Closure. Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.
Stephen Maitzen (2007). Cornea and Closure. Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):83-86.
Andrew Graham & Stephen Maitzen (2007). Cornea and Closure. Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):83-86.
Stephen J. Wykstra (2007). Cornea, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement. Faith and Philosophy 24 (1):87-98.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #81,690 of 722,765 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,765 )
How can I increase my downloads?