David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293 (2010)
Whether or not an intentional explanation of action necessarily involves law-like statements is related to another question, namely, is it a causal explanation? The Popper-Hempel Thesis , which answers both questions affirmatively, inevitably faces a dilemma between realistic and universalistic requirements. However, in terms of W.C. Salmon’s concept of causal explanation, intentional explanation can be a causal one even if it does not rely on any laws. Based on this, we are able to refute three characteristic arguments for the claim “reason is not a cause of action,” namely, the “proper logical” argument, the “logical relation” argument, and the “rule-following” argument. This rebuttal suggests that the causal relationship between reason and action can provide a justification for intentional explanations.
|Keywords||intentional explanation causality laws of nature philosophy of the social sciences|
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References found in this work BETA
Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Donald Davidson (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
A. Macintyre (1984). After Virtue. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
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