Is conceivability a guide to possibility?

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Keywords Belief  Conceivability  Epistemology  Experience  Language  Model  Proposition
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DOI 10.2307/2108052
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John Bengson (2013). Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Ben Blumson (2015). Fact, Fiction, and Fantasy. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):46-57.
Elijah Chudnoff (2015). Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):82-104.

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Similar books and articles
Phil Corkum (2012). Meta-Conceivability. Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):12.
David J. Chalmers (2002). Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 145--200.
George Bealer (2002). Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press 71-125.
Gordon Barnes (2000). Modal Inquiry: An Epistemological Study. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison

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