David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theoria 16 (40):65-75 (2001)
Mental causes are threatened from two directions: from below, since they would appear to be screened off by lower-order, e.g., neural states; and from within, since they would also appear to be screened off by intrinsic, e.g., syntactical states. A principle needed to parry the first threat -causes should be proportional to their effects- appears to leave us open to the second; for why should unneeded extrinsic detail be any less offensive to proportionality than excess microstructure? I say that the second threat relies on a perversion of proportionality that would lay waste to all causal relations
|Keywords||Body Epiphenomenalism Intentionality Metaphysics Mind Supervenience|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jaegwon Kim (2000). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
Jerome A. Shaffer (1965). Recent Work on the Mind-Body Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (April):81-104.
Keith Campbell (1980). Body And Mind, Reprint. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Benny Shanon (2008). Mind-Body, Body-Mind: Two Distinct Problems. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):697 – 701.
John Beloff (1987). Parapsychology and the Mind-Body Problem. Inquiry 30 (September):215-25.
Jaegwon Kim (1979). Causality, Identity and Supervenience in the Mind-Body Problem. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):31-49.
Jaegwon Kim (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads58 ( #21,682 of 1,008,333 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,735 of 1,008,333 )
How can I increase my downloads?