Textbook kripkeanism and the open texture of concepts

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):98–122 (2000)
Kripke, argued like this: it seems possible that E; the appearance can't be explained away as really pertaining to a "presentation" of E; so, pending a different explanation, it is possible that E. Textbook Kripkeans see in the contrast between E and its presentation intimations of a quite general distinction between two sorts of meaning. E's secondary or a posteriori meaning is the set of all worlds w which E, as employed here, truly describes. Its primary or a priori meaning is the set of all w such that if w is actual, then E is true. "Conceivability error" occurs when a primary possibility is mistaken for a secondary one. Textbook Kripkeanism is rejected on the grounds that it makes meaning too modal and modality too much a matter of meaning.
Keywords A Priori, Concept, Consciousness, Meaning, Metaphysics, Modality, Semantics
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00097
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Peter Kung (2010). Imagining as a Guide to Possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.
Alex Byrne (2007). Possibility and Imagination. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.

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