Online research in philosophy

The last 20 years or so has seen an intense search carried out within Dempster–Shafer theory, with the aim of finding a generalization of the Shannon entropy for belief functions. In that time, there has also been much progress made in credal set theory—another generalization of the traditional Bayesian epistemic representation—albeit not in this particular area. In credal set theory, sets of probability functions are utilized to represent the epistemic state of rational agents instead of the single probability function of traditional Bayesian theory. The Shannon entropy has been shown to uniquely capture certain highly intuitive properties of uncertainty, and can thus be considered a measure of that quantity. This article presents two measures developed with the purpose of generalizing the Shannon entropy for (1) unordered convex credal sets and (2) possibly non-convex credal sets ordered by second order probability, thereby providing uncertainty measures for such epistemic representations. There is also a comparison with the results of the measure AU developed within Dempster–Shafer theory in a few instances where unordered convex credal set theory and Dempster–Shafer theory overlap.

The theory of random propositions is a theory of confirmation that contains the Bayesian and Shafer—Dempster theories as special cases, while extending both in ways that resolve many of their outstanding problems. The theory resolves the Bayesian problem of the priors and provides an extension of Dempster's rule of combination for partially dependent evidence. The standard probability calculus can be generated from the calculus of frequencies among infinite sequences of outcomes. The theory of random propositions is generated analogously from the calculus of frequencies among pairs of infinite sequences of suitably generalized outcomes and in a way that precludes the inclusion of contrived orad hoc elements. The theory is also formulated as an uninterpreted calculus.

Combining testimonial reports from independent and partially reliable information sources is an important problem of uncertain reasoning. Within the framework of Dempster-Shafer theory, we propose a general model of partially reliable sources which includes several previously known results as special cases. The paper reproduces these results, gives a number of new insights, and thereby contributes to a better understanding of this important application of reasoning with uncertain and incomplete information.

An introduction to Dempster-Shafter Theory, from a lecture at the Northern Institute of Philosophy in 2010.

The Dempster–Shafer approach to expressing beliefabout a parameter in a statistical model is notconsistent with the likelihood principle. Thisinconsistency has been recognized for some time, andmanifests itself as a non-commutativity, in which theorder of operations (combining belief, combininglikelihood) makes a difference. It is proposed herethat requiring the expression of belief to be committed to the model (and to certain of itssubmodels) makes likelihood inference very nearly aspecial case of the Dempster–Shafer theory.