David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Andy Egan & B. Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford University Press (2011)
When I tell you that it’s raining, I describe a way the world is—viz., rainy. I say something whose truth turns on how things are with the weather in the world. Likewise when I tell you that the weatherman thinks that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I say turns on how things are with the weatherman’s state of mind in the world. Likewise when I tell you that I think that it’s raining. Here the truth of what I say turns on how things are with my state of mind in the world.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Nate Charlow (2014). The Problem with the Frege–Geach Problem. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.
Janice Dowell, J. L. (2013). Flexible Contextualism About Deontic Modals: A Puzzle About Information-Sensitivity. Inquiry 56 (2-3):149-178.
Seth Yalcin (2010). Probability Operators. Philosophy Compass 5 (11):916-37.
Nate Charlow (2014). Logic and Semantics for Imperatives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.
Andrew Sepielli (2012). Normative Uncertainty for Non-Cognitivists. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):191-207.
Similar books and articles
Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne (2013). Embedding Epistemic Modals. Mind 122 (488):867-914.
Joshua D. Crabill (2013). Suppose Yalcin is Wrong About Epistemic Modals. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):625-635.
Chase B. Wrenn (2007). Why There Are No Epistemic Duties. Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (01):115-136.
Kathrin Glüer & Peter Pagin (2008). Relational Modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17 (3):307-322.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads155 ( #8,265 of 1,699,575 )
Recent downloads (6 months)30 ( #20,497 of 1,699,575 )
How can I increase my downloads?