A new argument for evidentialism?

Philosophia 38 (2):399-404 (2010)
In his “A new argument for evidentialism” (Shah, Philos Q 56(225): 481–498, 2006 ), Nishi Shah argues that the best explanation of a feature of deliberation whether to believe that p which he calls transparency entails that only evidence can be reason to believe that p. I show that his argument fails because a crucial lemma that his argument appeals to cannot be supported without assuming evidentialism to be true in the first place.
Keywords Epistemology  Evidentialism  Doxastic deliberation  Constitutivism  Norm of belief
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    References found in this work BETA
    Nishi Shah (2006). A New Argument for Evidentialism. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.
    Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Anthony Robert Booth (2012). Epistemic Ought is a Commensurable Ought. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
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