David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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There are three main points of the paper. 1. There are straightforward ways of manipulating expected gains and losses that result in a divergence between fair betting odds and credence. Such manipulations are familiar from tools of finance. One can easily see that the Sleeping Beauty case is structured in such a way as to result in a divergence between fair betting odds and credence. 2. The inspection of credences and betting odds in certain betting situations shows that the two main extant positions, Elga's and Lewis's, are both mistaken. 3. My proposal may seem to require a revision of probability theory but it does not. The Sleeping Beauty case merely calls attention to a constraint on partitioning of possibility space that is usually satisfied as a matter of course but can in fact be violated.
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