Taking aim at the truth

Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59 (2012)
One prominent feature of belief is that a belief cannot be formed at will. This paper argues that the best explanation of this fact is that belief formation is a process that takes aim at the truth. Taking aim at the truth is to be understood as causal responsiveness of the processes constituting belief formation to what facilitates achieving true beliefs. The requirement for this responsiveness precludes the possibility of belief formation responding to intentions in a way that would count as forming a belief at will.
Keywords Belief  Doxastic voluntarism  Aim of belief
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9617-x
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