David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphilosophy 37 (1):112–129 (2006)
Kant has argued that moral requirements are categorical. Kant's claim has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers; this article defends Kant's doctrine. I argue that Kant's claim captures the unique feature of moral requirements. The main arguments against Kant's claim focus on one condition that a categorical imperative must meet: to be independent of desires. I argue that there is another important, but often ignored, condition that a categorical imperative must meet, and this second condition is crucial to understanding why moral requirements are not hypothetical. I also argue that the claim that moral requirements are not categorical because they depend on desires for motivation is beside the point. The issue of whether moral requirements are categorical is not an issue about whether moral desires or feelings are necessary for moral motivation but are rather an issue about the ground of moral desires or moral feelings. Moral requirements are categorical because they are requirements of reason, and reason makes moral desires or feelings possible.
|Keywords||subjective end intrinsic end hypothetical imperative categorical imperative moral feeling objective end|
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1981). Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980. Cambridge University Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Immanuel Kant (2007). Critique of Pure Reason. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 449-451.
Stephen L. Darwall (1983). Impartial Reason. Cornell University Press.
John McDowell (1978). Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 52:13-29+31-42.
Citations of this work BETA
Jeremy Langett (2013). Blogger Engagement Ethics: Dialogic Civility in a Digital Era. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 28 (2):79-90.
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