David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Informal Logic 13 (3) (1991)
How are dependent (or linked) premises to be distinguished from independent (or convergent) premises? Deductive validity, sometimes proposed as a necessary condition for depende'nce, cannot be, for the premises of both inductive and deductive but invalid arguments can be dependent. The question is really this: When do multiple premises for a certain conclusion fonn one argument for that conclusion and when do they form multiple arguments? Answer: Premises are dependent when the evidence they offer for their conclusion is more than the ordinary sum of their probabilities. Ordinary sums are defined in the paper
|Keywords||linked premises, convergent premises, induction, deduction|
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Citations of this work BETA
Marcin Selinger (2014). Towards Formal Representation and Evaluation of Arguments. Argumentation 28 (3):379-393.
Jeroen Keppens (2012). Argument Diagram Extraction From Evidential Bayesian Networks. Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (2):109-143.
Chris Reed (2014). Structured Arguments and Their Aggregation: A Reply to Selinger. Argumentation 28 (3):395-399.
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