Self-deception and the experience of fiction
Ratio 20 (1):108-121 (2007)
| Abstract | Sartre’s commentary on bad faith is the starting-point for an exploration of self-deception: what it is not, what it is, and whether it’s always wrong. The proffered analysis of selfdeception parallels a certain theory of our experience of fiction. In essence, it is argued that the self-deceiver creates a kind of fiction in which he is a character, a fiction that he nonetheless believes to be real | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,664 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesBernard Sarachek (1995). Images of Corporate Executives in Recent Fiction. Journal of Business Ethics 14 (3):195 - 205.
Robert Audi (1997). Self-Deception Vs. Self-Caused Deception: A Comment on Professor Mele. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):104-104.
Christopher Mole (2009). Fiction's Ontological Commitments. Philosophical Forum 40 (4):473-488.
Timothy Rayner (2003). Between Fiction and Reflection: Foucault and the Experience-Book. Continental Philosophy Review 36 (1):27-43.
Aaron Meskin & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2003). Emotions, Fiction, and Cognitive Architecture. British Journal of Aesthetics 43 (1):18-34.
Stavroula Glezakos (forthcoming). Truth and Reference in Fiction. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads34 ( #35,297 of 549,007 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,261 of 549,007 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
