Predicativity and structuralism in dedekind's construction of the reals

Erkenntnis 71 (2):157 - 173 (2009)
It is a commonly held view that Dedekind’s construction of the real numbers is impredicative. This naturally raises the question of whether this impredicativity is justified by some kind of Platonism about sets. But when we look more closely at Dedekind’s philosophical views, his ontology does not look Platonist at all. So how is his construction justified? There are two aspects of the solution: one is to look more closely at his methodological views, and in particular, the places in which predicativity restrictions ought to be applied; another is to take seriously his remarks about the reals as things created by the cuts, instead of considering them to be the cuts themselves. This can lead us to make finer-grained distinctions about the extent to which impredicative definitions are problematic, since we find that Dedekind’s use of impredicative definitions in analysis can be justified by his (non-Platonist) philosophical views.
Keywords Philosophy   Logic   Ethics   Ontology   Epistemology   Philosophy
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Solomon Feferman (1964). Systems of Predicative Analysis. Journal of Symbolic Logic 29 (1):1-30.

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