David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (1993)
In this book, Yaqub describes a simple conception of truth and shows that it yields a semantical theory that accommodates the whole range of our seemingly conflicting intuitions about truth. This conception takes the Tarskian biconditionals (such as "The sentence 'Johannes loved Clara' is true if and only if Johannes loved Clara") as correctly and completely defining the notion of truth. The semantical theory, which is called the revision theory, that emerges from this conception paints a metaphysical picture of truth as a property whose applicability is given by a revision process rather than by a fixed extension. The main advantage of this revision process is its ability to explain why truth seems in many cases almost redundant, in others substantial, and yet in others paradoxical (as in the famous Liar). Yaub offers a comprehensive defense of the revision theory of truth by developing consistent and adequate formal semantics for languages in which all sorts of problematic sentences (Liar and company) can be constructed. Yaqub concludes by introducing a logic of truth that further demonstrates the adequacy of the revision theory.
|Keywords||Truth Liar paradox|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$14.99 used (87% off) $62.52 new (46% off) $115.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD171.Y37 1993|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Jon Barwise (1987). The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity. Oxford University Press.
Philip Kremer (2009). Comparing Fixed-Point and Revision Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (4):363 - 403.
Aladdin M. Yaqub (2008). Two Types of Deflationism. Synthese 165 (1):77 - 106.
Keith Simmons (1993). Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and the Diagonal Argument. Cambridge University Press.
Jeffrey Ketland (2000). A Proof of the (Strengthened) Liar Formula in a Semantical Extension of Peano Arithmetic. Analysis 60 (1):1–4.
Ahmed Alwishah & David Sanson (2009). The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic World From the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries Ce. Vivarium (1):97-127.
André Chapuis (1996). Alternative Revision Theories of Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (4):399 - 423.
Nuel Belnap (2006). Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #176,685 of 1,789,801 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?