Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (4):423 - 434 (2006)
|Abstract||Gareth Evans proved that if two objects are indeterminately equal then they are different in reality. He insisted that this contradicts the assumption that there can be vague objects. However we show the consistency between Evans's proof and the existence of vague objects within classical logic. We formalize Evans's proof in a set theory without the axiom of extensionality, and we define a set to be vague if it violates extensionality with respect to some other set. There exist models of set theory where the axiom of extensionality does not hold, so this shows that there can be vague objects.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter Verdée & Stephan der Waart van Gulivank (2008). A Generic Framework for Adaptive Vague Logics. Studia Logica 90 (3):385 - 405.
Gareth Evans (1978). Can There Be Vague Objects? Analysis 38 (4):208.
Robert Williams (forthcoming). Multiple Actualities and Ontically Vague Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):071105092402004-???.
Nicholas Smith (2005). A Plea for Things That Are Not Quite All There: Or, Is There a Problem About Vague Composition and Vague Existence? Journal of Philosophy 102 (8):381 - 421.
Anthony Everett (1996). Qualia and Vagueness. Synthese 106 (2):205-226.
Nicholas J. J. Smith (2008). Why Sense Cannot Be Made of Vague Identity. Noûs 42 (1):1–16.
Joseph G. Moore (2008). A Modal Argument Against Vague Objects. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (12):1-17.
Elisa Paganini (2011). Vague Objects Without Ontically Indeterminate Identity. Erkenntnis 74 (3):351-362.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads20 ( #62,387 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,847 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?