Metaphysical realism, scepticism, and two dimensionalism
|Abstract||I understand (MR) as meaning that there is a way the world is that is independent of our minds or representations. One may also state (MR) in terms of ‘A description/language independent world/reality’ or ‘a conceptual scheme independent world/reality’. For our purposes, we need not distinguish these variants of formulation.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Sophie R. Allen (2002). Deepening the Controversy Over Metaphysical Realism. Philosophy 77 (4):519-541.
Stathis Psillos (2005). Scientific Realism and Metaphysics. Ratio 18 (4):385–404.
Robert J. Howell (2008). The Two-Dimensionalist Reductio. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):348-358.
Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2002). Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism. Noûs 36 (s1):74 - 96.
JeeLoo Liu, The Daoist Conception of Truth: Laozi's Metaphysical Realism Vs. Zhuangzi's Internal Realism.
Robert T. Lehe (1998). Realism and Reality. Journal of Philosophical Research 23:219-237.
Kai-Yee Wong (2006). Two-Dimensionalism and Kripkean A Posteriori Necessity. In Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford University Press.
Peter J. Graham (2002). Review of Gabor Forrai, Reference, Truth and Conceptual Schemes: A Defense of Internal Realism. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (2).
Simon P. James (2007). Merleau-Ponty, Metaphysical Realism and the Natural World. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (4):501 – 519.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads7 ( #133,305 of 548,974 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?