David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The Owl of Minerva 42 (1-2):41-62 (2010)
A primary fault line in the analytic philosophy of action is the debate between causal/Davidsonian and interpretivist/Anscombian theories of action. The fundamental problem of the former is producing a criterion for distinguishing intentional from non-intentional causal chains; the fundamental problem of the latter is producing an account of the relation between reasons and actions that is represented by the ‘because’ in the claim that the agent acted because she had the reason. It is argued that Hegel’s conception of teleology can be used to develop the interpretivist position by solving both its and the causal theory’s fundamental problems
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Michael Quante (2004). Hegel's Concept of Action. Cambridge University Press.
Rebekah L. H. Rice (2011). Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons. American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):333-346.
Jesus H. Aguilar (2003). Agency and Control. Dissertation, Mcgill University (Canada)
John M. Connolly (1991). Whither Action Theory. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:85-106.
Carlos J. Moya (2000). A Proposal About Intentional Action. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:55-63.
David-Hillel Ruben (2010). The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action. In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Action: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.
Robert K. Shope (1991). Non-Deviant Causal Chains. Journal of Philosophical Research 16:251-291.
Sarah K. Paul (2011). Deviant Formal Causation. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3).
Tom Rockmore (2004). Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy. Yale University Press.
John R. Searle (1979). The Intentionality of Intention and Action. Inquiry 22 (1-4):253 – 280.
Zhu Xu (2010). Laws, Causality and the Intentional Explanation of Action. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):280-293.
Mark Risjord (2005). Reasons, Causes, and Action Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (3):294-306.
Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (2010). Introduction : Hegel and Contemporary Philosophy of Action. In Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Hegel on Action. Palgrave Macmillan.
Added to index2012-03-18
Total downloads16 ( #118,564 of 1,681,623 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #112,085 of 1,681,623 )
How can I increase my downloads?