David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphysica 11 (2):191-210 (2010)
The central claim of the Parfitian psychological approach to personal identity is that the fact about personal identity is underpinned by a non-branching psychological continuity relation. Hence, for the advocates of the Parfitian view, it is important to understand what it is for a relation to take or not take a branching form. Nonetheless, very few attempts have been made in the literature of personal identity to define the non-branching clause. This paper undertakes this task. Drawing upon a recent debate between Anthony Brueckner and Harold Noonan on the issue, I present three candidates for the non-branching clause.
|Keywords||Fission Non-branching Parfit Personal identity Psychological approach|
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
David Wiggins (1980). Sameness and Substance. Harvard University Press.
Derek Parfit (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
David Lewis (1976). Survival and Identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press 17-40.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Parfit on What Matters in Survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
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