David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphysica 11 (2):191-210 (2010)
The central claim of the Parfitian psychological approach to personal identity is that the fact about personal identity is underpinned by a non-branching psychological continuity relation. Hence, for the advocates of the Parfitian view, it is important to understand what it is for a relation to take or not take a branching form. Nonetheless, very few attempts have been made in the literature of personal identity to define the non-branching clause. This paper undertakes this task. Drawing upon a recent debate between Anthony Brueckner and Harold Noonan on the issue, I present three candidates for the non-branching clause.
|Keywords||Fission Non-branching Parfit Personal identity Psychological approach|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Derek Parfit (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
David Wiggins (1980). Sameness and Substance. Harvard University Press.
Anthony L. Brueckner (1993). Parfit on What Matters in Survival. Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
David Lewis (1976). Survival and Identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press 17-40.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Christopher T. Buford (2008). The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Dialogue 47 (2):377-386.
Robert Francescotti (2008). Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21-31.
Anthony Brueckner & Christopher T. Buford (2008). The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity: Non-Branching and the Individuation of Person Stages. Dialogue 47 (2):377.
By Robert Francescotti (2008). Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21–31.
Anthony L. Brueckner (2005). Branching in the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Analysis 65 (288):294-301.
Harold W. Noonan (2006). Non-Branching and Circularity -- Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 66 (290):163-167.
Jiri Benovsky (2013). Branching and (in)Determinism. Philosophical Papers 42 (2):151-173.
Thomas Müller (2012). Branching in the Landscape of Possibilities. Synthese 188 (1):41-65.
Desheng Zong (2008). Three Forms of Psychological Discontinuity. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 18:103-127.
Steven Rieber (1998). The Concept of Personal Identity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):581-594.
Tomasz Placek (2012). On Individuals in Branching Histories. Synthese 188 (1):23-39.
Jens Johansson (2009). Francescotti on Fission. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):476-481.
Jiri Benovsky (2005). Branching Versus Divergent Possible Worlds. Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):12-20.
Added to index2010-09-13
Total downloads24 ( #160,121 of 1,906,942 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #468,570 of 1,906,942 )
How can I increase my downloads?