Non-branching Clause

Metaphysica 11 (2):191-210 (2010)
Abstract
The central claim of the Parfitian psychological approach to personal identity is that the fact about personal identity is underpinned by a non-branching psychological continuity relation. Hence, for the advocates of the Parfitian view, it is important to understand what it is for a relation to take or not take a branching form. Nonetheless, very few attempts have been made in the literature of personal identity to define the non-branching clause. This paper undertakes this task. Drawing upon a recent debate between Anthony Brueckner and Harold Noonan on the issue, I present three candidates for the non-branching clause.
Keywords Fission  Non-branching  Parfit  Personal identity  Psychological approach
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1976). Survival and Identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. 17-40.

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