David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 148 (2):201–219 (2010)
Comparisons of rival explanations or theories often involve vague appeals to explanatory <span class='Hi'>power</span>. In this paper, we dissect this metaphor by distinguishing between different dimensions of the goodness of an explanation: non-sensitivity, cognitive salience, precision, factual accuracy and degree of integration. These dimensions are partially independent and often come into conflict. Our main contribution is to go beyond simple stipulation or description by explicating why these factors are taken to be explanatory virtues. We accomplish this by using the contrastive-counterfactual approach to explanation and the view of understanding as an inferential ability. By combining these perspectives, we show how the explanatory <span class='Hi'>power</span> of an explanation in a given dimension can be assessed by showing the range of answers it provides to what-if-things-had-been-different questions and the theoretical and pragmatic importance of these questions. Our account also explains intuitions linking explanation to unification or to exhibition of a mechanism.
|Keywords||Explanation Understanding Explanatory power Inference to the best explanation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
James Woodward (2003). Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Judea Pearl (2000). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge University Press.
Peter Lipton (2004). Inference to the Best Explanation. Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Wesley C. Salmon (1998). Causality and Explanation. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Schaffer (2005). Contrastive Causation. Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
Citations of this work BETA
Christopher Clarke (forthcoming). The Explanatory Virtue of Abstracting Away From Idiosyncratic and Messy Detail. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
Cameron Buckner (2013). Morgan's Canon, Meet Hume's Dictum: Avoiding Anthropofabulation in Cross-Species Comparisons. Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):853-871.
Luca Moretti (2014). Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility. Erkenntnis 79 (2):381-403.
Petri Ylikoski (2013). Causal and Constitutive Explanation Compared. Erkenntnis 78 (2):277-297.
Cameron Buckner (2015). Functional Kinds: A Skeptical Look. Synthese 192 (12):3915-3942.
Similar books and articles
James Woodward (1987). On an Information-Theoretic Model of Explanation. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):21-44.
Jonah N. Schupbach (2011). Studies in the Logic of Explanatory Power. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Rebecca Schweder (1999). Causal Explanation and Explanatory Selection. Synthese 120 (1):115-124.
Frank Hindriks (2008). False Models as Explanatory Engines. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (3):334-360.
David E. Nelson (1996). Confirmation, Explanation, and Logical Strength. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):399-413.
Lukasz Hardt (2011). An Inquiry Into the Explanatory Virtues of Transaction Cost Economics. Journal of Philosophical Economics 5 (1):120-147.
Jonah N. Schupbach & Jan Sprenger (2011). The Logic of Explanatory Power. Philosophy of Science 78 (1):105-127.
Laura Felline (2011). Scientific Explanation Between Principle and Constructive Theories. Philosophy of Science 78 (5):989-1000.
Jaakko Kuorikoski & Petri Ylikoski (2010). Explanatory Relevance Across Disciplinary Boundaries: The Case of Neuroeconomics. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (2):219–228.
Adolfas Mackonis (2013). Inference to the Best Explanation, Coherence and Other Explanatory Virtues. Synthese 190 (6):975-995.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads195 ( #15,397 of 1,792,912 )
Recent downloads (6 months)12 ( #66,738 of 1,792,912 )
How can I increase my downloads?