David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):265 – 279 (2004)
This paper provides a conceptual analysis of the notion of interests as it is used in the social studies of science. After describing the theoretical background behind the Strong Program's adoption of the concept of interest, the paper outlines a reconstruction of the everyday notion of interest and argues that this same notion is used also by the sociologists of scientific knowledge. However, there are a couple of important differences between the everyday use of this notion and the way in which it used by the sociologists. The sociologists do not use the term in evaluative context and they do not regard interests as purely non-epistemic factors. Finally, it is argued that most of the usual critiques of interest explanations, by both philosophers and fellow sociologists, are misguided.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Bruno Latour (1987). Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society. Harvard University Press.
Jürgen Habermas (1978). Knowledge and Human Interests. Heinemann Educational.
Steven Shapin & Simon Schaffer (1989). Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life. Princeton University Press.
Ronald N. Giere (1991). Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.
David L. Hull (1988). Science as a Process an Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science. University of Chicago Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Gabrielle Ivinson, Brian Davies & John Fitz (eds.) (2011). Knowledge and Identity: Concepts and Applications in Bernstein's Sociology. Routledge.
Martin J. Pickering & Nick Chater (1995). Why Cognitive Science is Not Formalized Folk Psychology. Minds and Machines 5 (3):309-337.
G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
Samir Okasha (2000). The Underdetermination of Theory by Data and the "Strong Programme" in the Sociology of Knowledge. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 14 (3):283 – 297.
Angel Pinillos (2012). Practical Interests. In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press 192.
Jürgen Habermas (1966). Knowledge and Interest∗1. Inquiry 9 (1-4):285-300.
R. G. A. Dolby (1996). Uncertain Knowledge: An Image of Science for a Changing World. Cambridge University Press.
P. Thagard (1993). Societies of Minds: Science as Distributed Computing. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 24 (1):49-67.
Gabriel Abend (2006). Styles of Sociological Thought: Sociologies, Epistemologies, and the Mexican and U.S. Quests for Truth. Sociological Theory 24 (1):1 - 41.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads16 ( #236,751 of 1,911,771 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #323,440 of 1,911,771 )
How can I increase my downloads?