The Invisible Hand and Science

Science Studies 8 (2):32-43 (1995)
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Abstract

In this paper I will discuss the idea of the invisible hand in the connection of its recent use in the philosophy of science. It has been invoked by some philosophers of science with a naturalistic bent as a part of their account of science. Some have made explicit references to the idea (Hull, 1988a) and others have only presupposed it (Giere, 1988; Goldman, 1991; Kitcher, 1993). I will argue that there are some problematic features in the way the idea of the invisible hand isused inthese accounts. I will first discuss some general properties of the invisible hand explanations and then present some motives for its use in the theory of science. Then I will show how one particular philosopher of science, David Hull, uses the idea. I will use Hull's account as a practising target and offer some comments and criticism in order to promote more disciplined use of this model of explanation in science studies.

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Petri Ylikoski
University of Helsinki

Citations of this work

Understanding Interests and Causal Explanation.Petri Ylikoski - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
Invisible hands and the success of science.K. Brad Wray - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):163-175.
What’s Wrong with Invisible-Hand Explanations?David L. Hull - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):126.

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