Case study evidence for an irreducible form of knowing how to: An argument against a reductive epistemology
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 37 (2):341-360 (2009)
Over recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in arguments favouring intellectualism—the view that Ryle’s epistemic distinction is invalid because knowing how is in fact nothing but a species of knowing that. The aim of this paper is to challenge intellectualism by introducing empirical evidence supporting a form of knowing how that resists such a reduction. In presenting a form of visuomotor pathology known as visual agnosia, I argue that certain actions performed by patient DF can be distinguished from a mere physical ability because they are (1) intentional and (2) knowledge-based; yet these actions fail to satisfy the criteria for propositional knowledge. It is therefore my contention that there exists a form of intentional action that not only constitutes a genuine claim to knowledge but, in being irreducible to knowing that, resists the intellectualist argument for exhaustive epistemic reduction.
|Keywords||Knowing how Knowing that Propositional knowledge Reductive epistemology Intellectualism Visual agnosia|
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Gilbert Ryle (1949). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
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