David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837 (2006)
Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst still employing a Kantian approach, I speculate over possible mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of thought insertion
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Francis Bennett (1974). Kant's Dialectic. New York]Cambridge University Press.
José Luis Bermúdez (1994). The Unity of Apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason. European Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):213-240.
Andrew Brook (1994). Kant and the Mind. Cambridge University Press.
J. Campbell (1999). Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons and Thinking as a Motor Process. The Monist 82 (4):609-625.
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