Kant and the phenomenon of inserted thoughts

Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837 (2006)
Abstract
Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst still employing a Kantian approach, I speculate over possible mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of thought insertion
Keywords SCHIZOPHRENIA
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Francis Bennett (1974). Kant's Dialectic. New York]Cambridge University Press.
Andrew Brook (1994). Kant and the Mind. Cambridge University Press.

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