Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837 (2006)
|Abstract||Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst still employing a Kantian approach, I speculate over possible mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of thought insertion|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Christoph Hoerl (2001). On Thought Insertion. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):189-200.
Philip Simon Gerrans, Authorship and Ownership of Thoughts: A Review of G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts. [REVIEW]
Annalisa Coliva (2002). Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):27-34.
Peter Langland-Hassan (2008). Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity. Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.
Alexandre Billon (2011). Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion. Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
Lisa Bortolotti & Matthew Broome (2009). A Role for Ownership and Authorship in the Analysis of Thought Insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):205-224.
François Recanati (2009). De Re and de Se. Dialectica 63 (3):249-269.
Jordi Fernández (2010). Thought Insertion and Self-Knowledge. Mind and Language 25 (1):66-88.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads28 ( #44,147 of 549,549 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,549 )
How can I increase my downloads?