Kripke's Frege
Thought 1 (2):100-107 (2012)
| Abstract | In a recent essay, “Frege's Theory of Sense of Reference: Some Exegetical Notes”, Saul Kripke shows that in addition to being an astute critic of Frege, he is also an insightful interpreter. Kripke's Frege emerges as a closet Russellian, who, like Russell, relies heavily on a doctrine of acquaintance. Is Kripke right? Where exactly does his approach resemble, and where depart from earlier interpretations, and what should one take away about whether or not Frege really was a Russellian and the effect this has on his theory? | |||||||||
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Saul A. Kripke (2008). Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Some Exegetical Notes. Theoria 74 (3):181-218.
Wolfgang Künne (2010). Sense, Reference and Hybridity. Dialectica 64 (4):529-551.
Gideon Makin (2010). Frege's Distinction Between Sense and Reference. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):147-163.
Jesper Kallestrup (2003). Paradoxes About Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):107-117.
Wolfgang Carl (1994). Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope. Cambridge University Press.
William Demopoulos (1994). Frege, Hilbert, and the Conceptual Structure of Model Theory. History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2):211-225.
Gideon Makin (2000). The Metaphysicians of Meaning: Russell and Frege on Sense and Denotation. Routledge.
Cheng-Chih Tsai (2012). The Genesis of Hi-Worlds: Towards a Principle-Based Possible World Semantics. Erkenntnis 76 (1):101-114.
Jerrold J. Katz (1997). Analyticity, Necessity, and the Epistemology of Semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):1-28.
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