Kripke's Frege

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):100-107 (2012)
In a recent essay, “Frege's Theory of Sense of Reference: Some Exegetical Notes”, Saul Kripke shows that in addition to being an astute critic of Frege, he is also an insightful interpreter. Kripke's Frege emerges as a closet Russellian, who, like Russell, relies heavily on a doctrine of acquaintance. Is Kripke right? Where exactly does his approach resemble, and where depart from earlier interpretations, and what should one take away about whether or not Frege really was a Russellian and the effect this has on his theory?
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DOI 10.1002/tht3.15
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