Kripke's Frege

Thought 1 (2):100-107 (2012)
Abstract In a recent essay, “Frege's Theory of Sense of Reference: Some Exegetical Notes”, Saul Kripke shows that in addition to being an astute critic of Frege, he is also an insightful interpreter. Kripke's Frege emerges as a closet Russellian, who, like Russell, relies heavily on a doctrine of acquaintance. Is Kripke right? Where exactly does his approach resemble, and where depart from earlier interpretations, and what should one take away about whether or not Frege really was a Russellian and the effect this has on his theory?
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,875
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Jesper Kallestrup (2003). Paradoxes About Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):107-117.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-07-11

    Total downloads

    41 ( #28,484 of 556,837 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    2 ( #39,010 of 556,837 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums