Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):375–390 (2007)
|Abstract||On the basis of 3p9s and 3p39s of the Ethics, it might seem that, for Spinoza, a judgment about something's goodness or badness is motivationally inert and, moreover, that value judgments essentially reflect an individual's pre-existing motivational states. However, in this paper I show that Spinoza holds that under certain conditions a motivational state results from a value judgment. Spinoza's theory of motivation consists of two accounts of the psychological order of value judgments and motivational states: an account of their order in those in bondage as well as an account of their order in those who are free.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Justin Steinberg (2009). Spinoza on Civil Liberation. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (1):pp. 35-58.
Colin Marshall (2012). Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):139-160.
Simon B. Duffy (2009). Spinoza Today: The Current State of Spinoza Scholarship. Intellectual History Review 19 (1):111-132.
Michael LeBuffe (2010). From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2005). Motivation and Agency: Precis. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 123 (3):243–247.
Heidi M. Ravven (1989). Notes on Spinoza's Critique of Aristotle's Ethics. Philosophy and Theology 4 (1):3-32.
Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.
George Louis Kline (1952/1981). Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy: A Series of Essays, Selected and Translated, and with an Introduction. Hyperion Press.
Andrew Youpa (2009). Spinoza's Theory of the Good. In Olli Koistinen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Marx W. Wartofsky (1977). Nature, Number and Individuals: Motive and Method in Spinoza's Philosophy. Inquiry 20 (1-4):457 – 479.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #74,535 of 722,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,087 of 722,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?