Spinoza's theories of value

Abstract
According to a widely accepted reading of the "Ethics," Spinoza subscribes to a desire-satisfaction theory of value. A desire-satisfaction theory says that what has value is the satisfaction of one’s desires and whatever leads to the satisfaction of one’s desires. In this paper I argue that this standard reading is incorrect, and I show that in Spinoza’s view the foundation of what is truly valuable is the perfection of a person’s essence, not the satisfaction of a person’s desires.
Keywords theory of value  good  desire-satisfaction  perfectionism
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DOI 10.1080/09608781003643535
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Justin Steinberg (2015). Affect, Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (1):67-87.
Steven Nadler (2015). Spinoza on Lying and Suicide. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (2):257-278.

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