David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677-678 (2004)
The experience of free will has causal consequences, albeit not immediate ones. Although Wegner recognizes this, his model failed to incorporate this causal link. Is this experience central to “what makes us human”? A broad acceptance of Wegner's claim that free will is illusory has significant societal and religious consequences, therefore the threshold of evidence needs to be correspondingly high.
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