Synthese 175 (2):241-253 (2010)
|Abstract||Newman’s objection is sometimes taken to be a fatal objection to structural realism (SR). However, ambiguity in the definition of “structure” allows for versions that do not succumb to Newman’s objection. In this paper, I consider some versions of SR that maintain an abstract notion of structure yet avoid Newman’s objection. In particular, I consider versions suggested by Melia and Saatsi. They reject a solution that restricts the domain of the second-order quantifiers, and argue in favor of buttressing the language with intensional operators such as “it is physically necessary that...”. I argue that their favored solution effectively requires the former suggestion that they reject. This argument suggests that a notion of natural properties may be indispensable to SR.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Wei Wang (2008). A Critical Analysis of Structural Realism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (2):294-306.
Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam (2006). Moderate Structural Realism About Space-Time. Synthese 160 (1):27 - 46.
Bryan W. Roberts (2011). Group Structural Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):47-69.
Steven French & Juha Saatsi (2006). Realism About Structure: The Semantic View and Nonlinguistic Representations. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):548-559.
Ioannis Votsis (2003). Is Structure Not Enough? Philosophy of Science 70 (5):879-890.
Juha Saatsi (2009). Whence Ontological Structural Realism? In M. Suarez (ed.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer.
Daniel McArthur (2006). Recent Debates Over Structural Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 37 (2):209 - 224.
Joseph Melia & Juha Saatsi (2006). Ramseyfication and Theoretical Content. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):561-585.
Peter M. Ainsworth (2009). Newman's Objection. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):135-171.
Added to index2009-03-28
Total downloads46 ( #23,860 of 549,128 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,128 )
How can I increase my downloads?