Structuralism and the New Way of Worlds: A Sellarsian Argument for Necessitarianism about Laws

Philosophy of Science 78 (4):678-695 (2011)
This article presents and argues for modal structuralism, which is loosely derived from a position described by Wilfrid Sellars. Modal structuralism holds that a fundamental property is identified by the role it plays in the structure of possibilities. It implies necessitarianism about laws, which holds that at least some laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. The argument for these positions derives from the following assumptions: the principle of the identity of indiscernible properties and a modest antiquidditism. These assumptions are weaker than those of causal structuralism, which is a closely related view.
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DOI 10.1086/661752
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References found in this work BETA
Sydney Shoemaker (1998). Causal and Metaphysical Necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):59–77.
Brian Ellis & Caroline Lierse (1994). Dispositional Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):27 – 45.
Michael Tooley (1977). The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):667-98.
Chris Swoyer (1982). The Nature of Natural Laws. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):203 – 223.

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