David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Episteme 4 (3):252-263 (2007)
In this paper I distinguish three degrees of epistemic egoism, each of which has an ethical analogue, and I argue that all three are incoherent. Since epistemic autonomy is frequently identified with one of these forms of epistemic egoism, it follows that epistemic autonomy as commonly understood is incoherent. I end with a brief discussion of the idea of moral autonomy and suggest that its component of epistemic autonomy in the realm of the moral is problematic
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Foley (2005). Universal Intellectual Trust. Episteme 2 (1):5-12.
Citations of this work BETA
Stewart Clem (2013). The Epistemic Relevance of the Virtue of Justice. Philosophia 41 (2):301-311.
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