Ethical and epistemic egoism and the ideal of autonomy

Episteme 4 (3):252-263 (2007)
In this paper I distinguish three degrees of epistemic egoism, each of which has an ethical analogue, and I argue that all three are incoherent. Since epistemic autonomy is frequently identified with one of these forms of epistemic egoism, it follows that epistemic autonomy as commonly understood is incoherent. I end with a brief discussion of the idea of moral autonomy and suggest that its component of epistemic autonomy in the realm of the moral is problematic
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DOI 10.3366/E174236000700007X
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Allan Hazlett (2015). The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):131-151.

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