Horizontal intentionality and transcendental intersubjectivity

Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):304 - 321 (1997)
Abstract
Through an investigation of Husserl's concept of horizontal intentionality, the article basically argues that the horizon is intrinsically intersubjective, and that it entails an implicit reference to the intentions of possible Others. Against this background it is argued that our perceptual experience of an embodied Other, our factual encounter with the Other, is not the most basic and fundamental type of intersubjectivity. On the contrary, it presupposes a type of intersubjectivity which belongs a priori to the structure of constituting subjectivity
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Michael Madary (2012). Husserl on Perceptual Constancy. European Journal of Philosophy 20 (1):145-165.
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Joel Smith (2011). Can Transcendental Intersubjectivity Be Naturalised? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):91-111.
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