David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press 157--180 (2003)
If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore settled with a model of self-awareness based upon the subject-object dichotomy, with its entailed difference between the intending and the intended. As a consequence, Husserl never discovered the existence of pre-reflective self- awareness, but remained stuck in the traditional, but highly problematic reflection model of self-awareness
|Keywords||Consciousness Self-awareness Husserl|
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Thomas Fuchs (2013). Temporality and Psychopathology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):75-104.
Christoph Hoerl (2013). Husserl, the Absolute Flow, and Temporal Experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):376-411.
Jan Almäng (2013). Two Kinds of Time-Consciousness and Three Kinds of Content. Axiomathes 23 (1):61-80.
Dan Zahavi (2007). Perception of Duration Presupposes Duration of Perception - or Does It? Husserl and Dainton on Time. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3):453 – 471.
Ellen Fridland (2011). The Case for Proprioception. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):521-540.
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