David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 52 (6):551-573 (2009)
There is a long tradition in philosophy for claiming that selfhood is socially constructed and self-experience intersubjectively mediated. On many accounts, we consequently have to distinguish between being conscious or sentient and being a self. The requirements that must be met in order to qualify for the latter are higher. My aim in the following is to challenge this form of social constructivism by arguing that an account of self which disregards the fundamental structures and features of our experiential life is a non-starter, and that a correct description and account of the experiential dimension must do justice to the first-person perspective and to the primitive form of self-referentiality, mineness or for-me-ness that it entails. I then consider and discuss various objections to this account, in particular the view that an endorsement of such a minimal notion of self commits one to an outdated form of Cartesianism. In the final part of the paper, I argue that the self is so multifaceted a phenomenon that various complementary accounts must be integrated if we are to do justice to its complexity
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Dan Zahavi (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1988). The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Dan Zahavi (1999). Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. Northwestern University Press.
Sydney Shoemaker (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Dan Zahavi (2015). Self and Other: From Pure Ego to Co-Constituted We. Continental Philosophy Review 48 (2):143-160.
Dan Zahavi & Andreas Roepstorff (2011). Faces and Ascriptions: Mapping Measures of the Self. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):141-148.
Soraj Hongladarom (2013). Ubiquitous Computing, Empathy and the Self. AI and Society 28 (2):227-236.
Andrea Staiti (2013). A Grasp From Afar: Überschau and the Givenness of Life in Husserlian Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 46 (1):21-36.
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