Perception of duration presupposes duration of perception - or does it? Husserl and Dainton on time

In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to appraise the contemporary relevance of Husserl's analysis. How does it measure up against one of the more recent analytical accounts?
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References found in this work BETA
John Brough (1989). Husserl's Phenomenology of Time-Consciousness. In William R. McKenna & J. N. Mohanty (eds.), Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook. University Press of America 249--290.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michal Klincewicz (2012). Neural Correlates of Temporality? Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):704-706.
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