Ramseyfication and structural realism

Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (1):5-30 (2004)
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Abstract

Structural Realism (SSR), as embodied in the Ramsey-sentence H* of a theory H, is defended against the view that H* reduces to a trivial statement about the cardinality of the domain of H, a view which arises from ignoring the central role of observation within science. Putnam’s theses are examined and shown to support rather than undermine SSR. Finally: in view of its synthetic character, applied mathematics must enter into the formulation of H* and hence be shown to be finitely axiomatisable; this is done in the Appendix, which is the most important part of the paper.

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Citations of this work

Newman's objection.Peter M. Ainsworth - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):135-171.
Ramseyfication and theoretical content.Joseph Melia & Juha Saatsi - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):561-585.
The Structure of Causal Sets.Christian Wüthrich - 2012 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (2):223-241.

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References found in this work

Realism and reason.Hilary Putnam (ed.) - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.

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