In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness. John Benjamins (2004)
|Abstract||This was originally written and presented at the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar for College Teachers on Folk Psychology vs. Mental Simulation: How Minds Understand Minds, run by Robert Gordon at the University of Missouri - St. Louis, June-July 1999. It has been only lightly revised since, and should be considered a rough draft. Needless to say, the ideas herein owe a lot to what I learned at the seminar from Robert Gordon and the other participants, particularly Jim Garson. However, any errors are my responsibility alone|
|Keywords||Infancy Mind Self-awareness|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Wolf Mehling, Judith Wrubel, Jennifer Daubenmier, Cynthia Price, Catherine Kerr, Theresa Silow, Viranjini Gopisetty & Anita Stewart (2011). Body Awareness: A Phenomenological Inquiry Into the Common Ground of Mind-Body Therapies. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 6 (1):6-.
Shannon Spaulding (2010). Embodied Cognition and Mindreading. Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.
E. Fivaz-Depeursinge, N. Favez & F. Frascarolo (2004). Threesome Intersubjectivity in Infancy: A Contribution to the Development of Self-Awareness. In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.
Adrian Bardon (2007). Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):47-63.
Shaun Gallagher (2001). The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.
Uriah Kriegel (2003). Intrinsic Theory and the Content of Inner Awareness. Journal of Mind and Behavior 24 (2):169-196.
Gordon G. Gallup Jr, James R. Anderson & Steven M. Platek (2003). Self-Awareness, Social Intelligence and Schizophrenia. In Tilo Kircher & Anthony David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press.
Dan Zahavi (2002). First-Person Thoughts and Embodied Self-Awareness: Some Reflections on the Relation Between Recent Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (1):7-26.
Thomas Natsoulas (1993). What is Wrong with the Appendage Theory of Consciousness? Philosophical Psychology 6 (2):137-54.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads80 ( #9,693 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #19,181 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?