Journal of Philosophical Logic 9 (3):297-313 (1980)
|Abstract||The authors develop precise statements of the conditions under which there are nonexistent objects and of the conditions under which any two such objects are identical. Essentially, for any describable condition on properties, there is a nonexistent object which includes (but doesn't necessarily exemplify) just the properties satisfying the condition. The logic of inclusion is developed in detail. It is shown how these nonexistent objects can serve as the denotations of the names of fictional characters.|
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