A comparison of two intensional logics

Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (1):59-89 (1988)
The author examines the differences between the general intensional logic defined in his recent book and Montague's intensional logic. Whereas Montague assigned extensions and intensions to expressions (and employed set theory to construct these values as certain sets), the author assigns denotations to terms and relies upon an axiomatic theory of intensional entities that covers properties, relations, propositions, worlds, and other abstract objects. It is then shown that the puzzles for Montague's analyses of modality and descriptions, propositional attitudes, and directedness towards nonexistents can be solved using the author's logic.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00635757
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References found in this work BETA
Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Situations and Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Richard Montague (1975). Formal Philosophy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):573-578.

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