A classically-based theory of impossible worlds

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):640-660 (1997)
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Abstract

The appeal to possible worlds in the semantics of modal logic and the philosophical defense of possible worlds as an essential element of ontology have led philosophers and logicians to introduce other kinds of `worlds' in order to study various philosophical and logical phenomena. The literature contains discussions of `non-normal worlds', `non-classical worlds', `non-standard worlds', and `impossible worlds'. These atypical worlds have been used in the following ways: (1) to interpret unusual modal logics, (2) to distinguish logically equivalent propositions, (3) to solve the problems associated with propositional attitude contexts, intentional contexts, and counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, and (4) to interpret systems of relevant and paraconsistent logic. However, those who have attempted to develop a genuine metaphysical theory of such atypical worlds tend to move too quickly from philosophical characterizations to formal semantics.

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Edward Zalta
Stanford University

Citations of this work

Modality and Explanatory Reasoning.Boris Christian Kment - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Impossible Worlds.Francesco Berto - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2013):en ligne.
Hyperintensionality.Francesco Berto & Daniel Nolan - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Beyond possible worlds.Takashi Yagisawa - 1988 - Philosophical Studies 53 (2):175 - 204.
Ways Things Can't Be.Greg Restall - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
Who's Afraid of Impossible Worlds?Edwin D. Mares - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):516-526.

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