Descartes's Theory of Substance: Why He was Not a Trialist

In this work I argue that Descartes was not a trialist by showing that the main tenets of trialist interpretations of Descartes's theory of substance are either not supported by the text or are not sufficient for establishing the trialist interpretation.
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DOI 10.1080/09608788.2011.563519
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Paul Hoffman (2002). Descartes's Theory of Distinction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):57-78.

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