David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34 - 58 (2008)
I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to generate a version of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180 (3):357-389.
Peter D. Klein (2004). What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.
Rosalind S. Simson (1986). An Internalist View of the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):179-208.
William Roche (2012). A Reply to Cling's “The Epistemic Regress Problem”. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):263-276.
Peter Klein (2007). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
David Shatz (1983). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit. Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
José L. Zalabardo (2006). BonJour, Externalism and the Regress Problem. Synthese 148 (1):135-169.
Thomas Grundmann (1999). BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):463-479.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads94 ( #14,721 of 1,140,266 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #61,130 of 1,140,266 )
How can I increase my downloads?