Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress

I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalism that ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to generate a version of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles.
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B. J. C. Madison (2010). Epistemic Internalism. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.

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