Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34-58 (2008)
|Abstract||I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalismthat ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to generate aversion of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Benjamin Bayer (2011). A Role for Abstractionism in a Direct Realist Foundationalism. Synthese 180:357-389.
Peter D. Klein (2004). What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is That It Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166–171.
Rosalind S. Simson (1986). An Internalist View of the Epistemic Regress Problem. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):179-208.
William Roche (2012). A Reply to Cling's “The Epistemic Regress Problem”. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):263-276.
Peter Klein (2007). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Progress of Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 134 (1):1 - 17.
David Shatz (1983). Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Levels Gambit. Synthese 55 (1):97 - 118.
José L. Zalabardo (2006). BonJour, Externalism and the Regress Problem. Synthese 148 (1):135-169.
Thomas Grundmann (1999). BonJour's Self-Defeating Argument for Coherentism. Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):463-479.
José L. Zalabardo (2008). Internalist Foundationalism and the Problem of the Epistemic Regress. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34-58.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads74 ( #11,168 of 549,700 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,807 of 549,700 )
How can I increase my downloads?