Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):34-58 (2008)
|Abstract||I provide a construal of the epistemic regress problem and I take issue with the contention that a foundationalist solution is incompatible with an internalist account of warrant. I sketch a foundationalist solution to the regress problem that respects a plausible version of internalism. I end with the suggestion that the strategy that I have presented is not available only to the traditional versions of foundationalismthat ascribe foundational status to experiential beliefs. It can also be used to generate aversion of internalist foundationalism based on reliabilist principles|
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