Kripke's normativity argument

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):467-488 (1997)
Abstract
In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke rejects some of the most popular accounts of what meaning facts consist in on the grounds that they fail to accommodate the normative character of meaning. I argue that a widespread interpretation of Kripke's argument is incorrect. I contend that the argument does not rest on the contrast between descriptive and normative facts, but on the thought that speakers' uses of linguistic expressions have to be justified. I suggest that the line of reasoning that I attribute to Kripke can be seen as putting pressure on the idea that predicate satisfaction is to be explained in terms of a relation between predicates and properties.
Keywords Epistemology  Normativity  Private Language  Kripke, S  Wittgenstein
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Citations of this work BETA
Hannah Ginsborg (2012). Meaning, Understanding and Normativity. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):127-146.
Adrian Haddock (2012). Meaning, Justification, and'Primitive Normativity'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):147-174.
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