David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 51 (2):213-239 (1987)
In the debate about the nature and identity of possible worlds, philosophers have neglected the parallel questions about the nature and identity of moments of time. These are not questions about the structure of time in general, but rather about the internal structure of each individual time. Times and worlds share the following structural similarities: both are maximal with respect to propositions (at every world and time, either p or p is true, for every p); both are consistent; both are closed (every modal consequence of a proposition true at a world is also true at that world, and every tense-theoretic consequence of a proposition true at a time is also true at that time); just as there is a unique actual world, there is a unique present moment; and just as a proposition is necessarily true iff true at all worlds, a proposition is eternally true iff true at all times. In this paper, I show that a simple extension of my theory of worlds yields a theory of times in which the above structural similarities between the two are consequences.
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Thomas M. Crisp (2007). Presentism and the Grounding Objection. Noûs 41 (1):90–109.
Daniel Nolan (2015). The A Posteriori Armchair. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):211-231.
Leo Carton Mollica (2015). Explanation and Nowness: An Objection to the A-Theory. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2513-2530.
Meghan Sullivan (2012). Problems for Temporary Existence in Tense Logic. Philosophy Compass 7 (1):43-57.
Edward N. Zalta (1993). Twenty-Five Basic Theorems in Situation and World Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (4):385-428.
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