David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (4):385-428 (1993)
The foregoing set of theorems forms an effective foundation for the theory of situations and worlds. All twenty-five theorems seem to be basic, reasonable principles that structure the domains of properties, relations, states of affairs, situations, and worlds in true and philosophically interesting ways. They resolve 15 of the 19 choice points defined in Barwise (1989) (see Notes 22, 27, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39, 43, and 45). Moreover, important axioms and principles stipulated by situation theorists are derived (see Notes 33, 37, and 38). This is convincing evidence that the foregoing constitutes a theory of situations. Note that worlds are just a special kind of situation, and that the basic theorems of world theory, which were derived in previous work, can still be derived in this situation-theoretic setting. So there seems to be no fundamental incompatibility between situations and worlds — they may peacably coexist in the foundations of metaphysics. The theory may therefore reconcile two research programs that appeared to be heading off in different directions. And we must remind the reader that the general metaphysical principles underlying our theory were not designed with the application to situation theory in mind. This suggests that the general theory and the underlying distinction have explanatory power, for they seem to relate and systematize apparently unrelated phenomena
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Citations of this work BETA
Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta (2013). The Fundamental Theorem of World Theory. Journal of Philosophical Logic (2-3):1-31.
Mark Jago (2011). Setting the Facts Straight. Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (1):33-54.
Otávio Bueno, Christopher Menzel & Edward N. Zalta (2013). Worlds and Propositions Set Free. Erkenntnis (4):1-24.
Edward N. Zalta (2006). Deriving and Validating Kripkean Claims Using the Theory of Abstract Objects. Noûs 40 (4):591–622.
Anthony F. Beavers (2011). Recent Developments in Computing and Philosophy. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):385-397.
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