Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief

Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21 (2010)
The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790903318524
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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Citations of this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2013). Why We Reason the Way We Do. Philosophical Issues 23 (1):311-325.
Thomas Raleigh (2013). Belief Norms and Blindspots. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):243-269.

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