Why believe the truth? Shah and Velleman on the aim of belief

Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 – 21 (2010)
Abstract
The subject matter of this paper is the view that it is correct, in an absolute sense, to believe a proposition just in case the proposition is true. I take issue with arguments in support of this view put forward by Nishi Shah and David Velleman
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References found in this work BETA
A. Phillips Griffiths (1962). On Belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63:167 - 186.

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Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Raleigh (2013). Belief Norms and Blindspots. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):243-269.
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