David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Edoardo Zamuner (ed.)
Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society (2004)
This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the idea that pretence is justifiably ascribed on the same evidential basis, which justifies any other-ascriptions. The two arguments show that other-ascriptions of psychological states and pretence-ascriptions share the same evidential basis. This allows Wittgenstein to say that the sceptic’s appeal to the possibility of pretence implies a contradiction.
|Keywords||Wittgenstein other minds pretence expressions mental states emotions feelings mental-state ascriptions psychological ascriptions evidence|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Edoardo Zamuner (2004). “Treating the Sceptic with Genuine Expression of Feeling. Wittgenstein’s Later Remarks on the Psychology of Other Minds”. In A. Roser & R. Raatzsch (eds.), Jahrbuch der Deutschen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft. Peter Lang Verlag
Edoardo Zamuner (2004). “Wittgenstein on the Fallacy of the Argument From Pretence”. In Contributions of the Austrian Wittgenstein Society.
Jeffery Geller (1988). Introspection in Psychology and Philosophy. Philosophy Research Archives 13:471-480.
Jordi Fernandez (2007). Desire and Self-Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):517-536.
Edoardo Zamuner (2008). Knowledge and Self-Knowledge of Emotions. Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
Joel Smith (2006). Which Immunity to Error? Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.
Elizabeth H. Wolgast (1964). Wittgenstein and Criteria. Inquiry 7 (1-4):348 – 366.
Somogy Varga (2011). Pretence, Social Cognition and Self-Knowledge in Autism. Psychopathology 44 (1):45-52..
Christoph Jäger (2009). Affective Ignorance. Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.
Joshua Knobe & Jesse J. Prinz (2008). Intuitions About Consciousness: Experimental Studies. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):67-83.
Peter Carruthers (2006). Why Pretend? In Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Clarendon Press
Dale Jacquette (1994). Wittgenstein on Private Language and Privat Mental Objects. Wittgenstein-Studien 1 (1).
Mark Phelan, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols (2013). Thinking Things and Feeling Things: On an Alleged Discontinuity in Folk Metaphysics of Mind. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):703-725.
Added to index2010-12-18
Total downloads76 ( #44,510 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #99,332 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?