Against moral response-dependence

Erkenntnis 59 (3):285 - 290 (2003)
Response-dependent theories of morality are currently popular. I suspect that this is because they combine ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ elements in an appealing way. Such theories seem to do justice to the idea that morality is out there to be known, at the same time as connecting moral judgements with our affective and motivational states. However, I shall argue that all response-dependent theories of morality are irretrievably flawed.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Ethics   Logic   Ontology
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